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We analyze the impact of labor demand and labor market regula-
tions on the corporate structure of firms. We find that higher wages
are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these
high wages are caused by labor market regulations, unions or higher
labor demand. These comparative static results are in line with the
broad trends in the data. We also find that the organization of firms
has important macroeconomic implications. In particular, monitoring
is a type of "rent-seeking" activity and the decentralized equilibrium
spends excessive resources on monitoring. Labor market regulations
that reduce monitoring by pushing wages up may increase net out-
put or reduce it only by a small amount even though they reduce
employment.
Keywords: Corporate Structure, Efficiency Wages, Labor Market
Regulations, Monitoring, Moral Hazard.
JEL Classification: J41, L23.
1 Introduction
The way firms are organized to provide incentives to their employees varies
across countries and changes over time. Consider the measure of organi-
zational form depicted in Figure 1, which plots the ratio of managerial to
production workers in six countries over the past couple of decades.1 The
U.S. and Canada have more managers per worker than the other countries.
Moreover, while the ratio of managers to workers is constant or increasing
only slightly in Italy, Spain, Japan and Norway, it appears to increase rapidly
in the U.S. and Canada. Crude as this measure of organization may be, it
is consistent with what a large industrial relations and business history lit-
erature has depicted about international and temporal variations in business
practice and organization.2
What could account for these differences in organization? One possibility
is technology. But are the technologies in use across industries in the ad-
vanced industrial nations so different that they could explain the dramatic
variations depicted in Figure 1? While certainly a logical possibility, there
appears to be no evidence to suggest that these organizational differences
are merely consequences of exogenous technological differences. In this pa-
per we therefore take an alternative approach and argue that labor demand
and regulations lead to endogenous differences in organizational forms.
Corporate structure itself is a choice variable for firms, and like many
of their decisions, will be determined partly by market conditions. We con-
struct a simple general equilibrium model in which conditions in the labor
1The data plotted are ratios of managers to non-agricultural, non-managerial workers,
calculated from the Labor Statistics of the International Labor Organization. The sources
of the data are the labor force surveys of the respective countries (Current Population
Survay for the U.S.). These data have to be interpreted carefully, as the definition of a
manager may vary across countries. Other countries do not have enough years to construct
a time-series in the ILO data set, but cross-sectional comparsions are in line with the data
reported here: with the exception of the U.K., all other countries appear to have lower
ratios of managerial workers in their workforces than the U.S. and Canada.
2See, for example, Appelbaum and Batt (1995) for an overview, Chandler (1977) for a
history of U.S. frms, and Freeman and Lazear (1994) on the contrast of some aspects of
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Figure 1: Trends in the ratio of managerial employees to non-managerial,
non-agricultural workers in six countries. Source ILO Labor Statistics.
market — both supply-and-demand and regulatory — will lead firms to make
different organizational choices. Moreover, we will find that firms' responses
to changes in labor market fundamentals are in line with the time trends
indicated in Figure 1. We will also show that the organizational choices of
firms not only respond to the state of the macroeconomy, but can also have
a substantial influence on its performance. This is because firms spend con-
siderable resources on monitoring, which could otherwise be used for directly
productive activities. Therefore, it is important to take the organizational
implications of labor market policies into account in calculating their welfare
consequences.
The logic of our approach is best understood by considering the incen-
tives of a single worker in a profit-maximizing firm. After signing on with
the firm, the worker takes an unobserved effort decision: he may work or
shirk. Although this effort choice is not directly observed, the firm can de-
tect it with a certain probability that depends on the amount of resources
devoted to monitoring.3 The contract between worker and firm will specify
a compensation level which depends on whether he has been detected shirk-
ing. Crucially, we assume that there are liability limitations on workers: no
contract can punish a worker arbitrarily severely. As is well-known, this will
lead to equilibrium rents (efficiency-wages) for workers in order to induce
them to exert effort.
In making his effort decision, the worker takes account of three factors:
(i) the wage (rent) he is risking to lose by shirking; (ii) his payoff if fired
for having shirked; and (iii) the probability of being detected when shirking.
The key point is that all three will be affected not merely by the technologies
of the firm or legal contractual restrictions, but also by market conditions.
The main market conditions that we will focus on in this paper are the state
of labor demand and labor market regulations.4
3In this context, monitoring should be interpreted broadly: anything which provides
some information about worker effort is valuable to the firm (Holmstrom, 1979). A host of
organizational variables, such as the number of management and supervisory personnel,
the amount of discretion given to workers, the employment of accountants and consultants,
or the use of certain kinds of production or information technologies are all measures of
the degree of monitoring. This degree of monitoring, and more specifically the ratio
of supervisors and managers to production workers, will be our measure of corporate
structure in this paper.
4Since organizational forms are costly to restructure, changes in labor market conditions
that we refer to should probably be thought of as long-lived — a decade or so — rather
First consider the impact of labor demand on incentives and monitor-
ing. An increase in labor demand creates three effects on worker's incentives
corresponding to three factors that the worker takes into account in making
his effort decision. The first is the ex ante utility effect: in a tighter labor
market, the ex ante utility and the equilibrium wages of workers are higher
because firms are competing in order to attract workers.5 In our world where
limited liability constraints prevent negative wages, a high level of compensa-
tion naturally translates into high powered incentives. In other words, when
firms are forced to pay high wages to workers because of market conditions,
they can use these attractive wages to provide them with the right incentives
and do not need a high level of monitoring.
The second force is the ex-post reservation utility effect. When labor
demand is high workers know that being fired is not a harsh punishment
because they can get a new job relatively easily (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).
This implies that firms will need to monitor their employees closely when
labor demand is high. Finally, in a tight labor market, the demand for the
resources used for monitoring will also increase. For example, when workers
are used to monitor other workers, the cost of monitoring will increase with
the level wages. This cost-of-monitoring effect also works in the direction of
reducing monitoring in tight labor markets: when the cost of monitoring is
high as in times of buoyant labor demand, firms will want to use less of it.
We will show that the first and the third effects always dominate the
second: when higher labor demand increases wages, the amount monitoring
is reduced. Another set of variables that vary across countries and time
periods is labor market regulations and institutions. In particular, unions and
minimum wage type regulations increase wages relative to labor productivity.
Again the ex ante utility effect comes into action and predicts that labor
market institutions that increase wages should lead to less monitoring.6
One reason to be interested in the choice of corporate structure is that
it has important macroeconomic implications in our economy. The basic
than of business-cycle frequency.
5
 The firm is offering a high ex ante utility, rather than an ex post utility, because even
if the worker is hired with an attractive contract, he will receive a low wage and will be
fired if he is caught shirking. This distinction between ex-ante and ex-post values will be
important in our analysis.
6
 The exception of course is regulations that directly or indirectly prevent firms from
firing workers that shirk.
result we obtain here is that the decentralized equilibrium spends excessive
resources on monitoring, and since these resources could have been used more
productively, it fails to maximize net output. The intuitive reason is that
monitoring is at some level a type of "rent-seeking" activity: it enables the
firm to reduce wages, transferring resources from workers to firms. A social
planner who cares only about aggregate output would want to raise payments
to workers in order to save on monitoring costs.
Now, consider the implications of our model for the cross-country trends
shown in Figure 1. Many economists believe that due labor market regula-
tions and more powerful unions, wages are higher relative to labor produc-
tivity in Europe than in North America (e.g. Layard et al., 1991, OECD,
1994). The immediate implication of our model is that European firms should
spend less on monitoring, and in Figure 1, it appears that Canada and the
U.S. have many more managers than other countries. Also surprisingly, de-
spite the more intense wage pressure and the stagnant employment, output
has grown at the same rate in Europe as in the U.S., and labor produc-
tivity has grown faster (e.g. Houseman, 1995). This is consistent with our
model which predicts that an economy that spends a large fraction of its
productive resources on monitoring should have relatively low productivity,
because monitoring is partly unproductive. Therefore, when their impact on
corporate structure is taken into account, labor market regulations, which
are inefficient in a number of dimensions, may have less detrimental effects
than the conventional wisdom suggests, and may even increase total output,
even though they will always reduce employment.
Next, consider the changes in the U.S. labor market over the past two
decades. Wages for unskilled and production workers have fallen by as much
as 30% (e.g. Freeman, 1995) and Figure 1 suggests that in the mean time,
the ratio of managers in total employment has increased rapidly. The con-
ventional wisdom is that a combination of globalization and technological
changes has reduced demand for unskilled workers (e.g. Berman, Bound and
Grilliches, 1992, Katz and Murphy, 1992). Our theory suggests that what-
ever the reason for the fall in the wages of production workers, the corporate
structure designed to control and motivate them has to change substantially.
Therefore, in our theory, the increase in the ratio of managers and some of
the other organizational changes may be the result of firms' efforts to re-
store worker incentives eroded by falling wages. Once more our theory also
predicts that as the amount of resources spent in monitoring increase, la-
bor productivity would be lower, which is also consistent with recent U.S.
trends. Finally, the extension of our model to two types of workers in Section
4 will predict that a reduction in the demand for production workers will not
only reduce their wages and increase monitoring, but may also increase the
salaries of college graduate workers who are more heavily used in monitoring
activities.
Our work is clearly related to the "efficiency wage" literature of a decade
ago (Foster and Wan, 1984; Bulow and Summers, 1985; see Katz, 1987,
and Weiss, 1990, for surveys), especially to the work of Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). The main difference of our analysis is that we endogenize the mon-
itoring technology and try to understand some cross-country patterns and
temporal developments in the organization of firms through this lens. To our
knowledge, ours is the only model that analyzes the impact of labor demand
and regulations on corporate structure and economic performance.7
Our model in Section 2 is a static one which only focuses on the ex-ante
utility effect we mentioned above but nevertheless illustrates the basic mech-
anism at work. In Section 3, we generalize our model to a dynamic setting
which also incorporates the ex-post utility and cost-of-monitoring effects dis-
cussed above. The setup is based on Shapiro and Stiglitz's model, but nests
their model as well as our model of section 2 as special cases. We show that
in the original Shapiro-Stiglitz model, labor market regulations that increase
wages will have the same effect as in our static model, but a change in labor
demand conditions could leave the degree of monitoring unchanged. This is
because the trade-off between wages and monitoring is such that firms prefer
to increase wages but leave monitoring unaffected in response to a tightening
labor market. We demonstrate, however, that this result is not robust. For
example, if firms can have contractual arrangements with their workers (as
in our static model), or if the cost of monitoring is endogenized so that it
changes with the state of labor demand, then a tighter labor market will lead
to less monitoring, as our basic and more tractable model of section 2 shows.
The paper concludes with some extensions of our basic framework. First
of all, to the extent that more educated workers are engaged in monitoring,
7Calvo and Wellisz (1979) also endogenize monitoring in an efficiency wage model but
without our focus on the determinants of corporate structure. Finally, Gordon (1996)
has also pointed out some of the same differences between the U.S. and other economies'
corporate organizations, but sought to explain these differences by arguing that corporate
bureaucracies have a tendency to expand, and they have been allowed to do so in the U.S.
an increase in the amount of monitoring activities will increase their earnings
relative to the wages of production workers, thus linking wage inequality to
corporate structure. Secondly, if one of the roles of information technology is
to provide more information about worker behavior and thus facilitate moni-
toring, the changes in labor market conditions that we discuss will change the
demand for information technology. Finally we briefly discuss the possible
responses of firms' use of long-term contracts to labor market changes. The
main conclusion here is that the value of these contracts depends on prevail-
ing wages and monitoring costs, and so, like other aspects of organization,
their use will be governed by the labor market equilibrium.
2 A Static Model
We start with a one-period model which illustrates the basic ideas in the
simplest environment. In particular, it focuses on the ex-ante utility effect,
and abstracts from the other two effects discussed in the introduction. Those
will be incorporated in the dynamic model of the next section and shown not
to affect the basic qualitative conclusions reached with the static model.
2.1 Basics
Consider a one-period economy consisting of a continuum of measure N of
workers and a continuum of measure 1 of firm owners who are different from
the workers.8 Each firm i has the production function AF(Li) where L{ is
the number of workers it hires who choose to exert effort. Workers who shirk
(do not exert effort) are not productive. In a world without moral hazard,
8We are implicitly assuming that firms are agents who own some sort of capital (hu-
man or physical) for which the market is imperfect. Workers are then agents who are not
initially endowed with such capital. This prevents free entry which would compete away
all firm profits (which are really just returns to this capital). The crucial "limited liabili-
ty" assumption we make below simultaneously helps to explain why workers cannot post
incentive bonds (which would obviate the need for monitoring), why they have imperfect
access to capital and cannot therefore form their own firms, and why there is a covariance
of power and level of compensation. We abstract from further consideration of the capital
market to keep things tractable. For a model which explicitly treats the role of capital
market imperfections in determining the type and efficiency of organizational form, see
Legros and Newman (1996).
firms would simply contract with the workers to exert effort, but in our
economy this is impossible because firms do not directly observe whether their
employees have exerted effort or not. We also assume that firms are large, so
that the output of an individual worker is not observable and therefore not
contractible.
A firm can use other information to give the correct incentives to its work-
ers. A worker's actions affect the probability distribution of some observable
signal on the basis of which the firm compensates him (e.g. Holmstrom,
1979). Specifically, when the worker exerts effort, this signal takes the value
1. When he shirks, this signal is equal to 1 with probability 1 — qi and 0
with probability qi. The worker, like the firm, is risk-neutral and maximizes
income minus effort cost which is denoted by e.
The probability of detecting low effort by the worker, <&, is determined by
a host of factors including the production technology used by the firm, the
numbers of supervisors, managers and accountants, and more generally the
information technology of the firm (e.g. computers and cameras). Our analy-
sis turns on the fact that firms are able to choose many of these attributes
of organization; thus qi will be a key decision variable in our analysis. We
assume that q{ = q(rrii) where m^ is the degree of monitoring per worker
by firm i\ the cost of monitoring for firm i which hires Li workers is sniiLi.
For example, we can think of rrii as the number of managers per production
worker and 5 as the salary of managers. For now, s is fixed and exogenous.
In the next section, we will endogenize s as an equilibrium outcome. We
assume that q is increasing, concave and differentiable with q(0) = 0 and
q(m) < 1 for all m. The choice of q{ in our model will be the crucial aspect
of organizational form.9
Since there is a limited liability constraint, workers cannot be paid a neg-
ative wage, and the worst thing that can happen to a worker is to receive
an income of zero. Since all agents are risk-neutral, without loss of general-
ity we can restrict attention to the case where workers are paid zero when
caught shirking. Therefore, the incentive compatibility constraint of a worker
employed in firm i can be written as:
9In fact, throught most of the paper q will be the only endogenous aspect of organiza-
tional form; in section 5 we will discuss some other dimensions of corporate structure.
If the worker exerts effort, he gets utility Wi — e, which gives the left hand
side of the expression. If he chooses to shirk, he gets caught with probability
qi and receives zero. If he is not caught, he gets Wi without suffering the cost
of effort. This gives the right hand side of the expression.
Firm z's maximization problem can be written as:
max II = AF(Li) — WiLi — srriiLi (1)
subject to:
w{ > — ^ - (2)
Wi — e > u (3)
The first constraint is the incentive compatibility condition rearranged, and
the second is the participation constraint where u is the ex ante reservation
utility (outside option) of the worker.
As we pointed out in the Introduction, it is important to bear in mind
the difference between the ex ante and ex post outside options. These play
distinct roles in the worker's incentive problem, and are affected differently
by market conditions. Specifically, if the worker gets fired for shirking, he
does not receive u but instead gets 0, ex post outside option (recall there is
no more production after the first period). On the other hand, the firm takes
the ex ante reservation utility u as given: constraint (3) reflects the fact that
it is not enough for a firm to convince the worker to exert effort once he has
joined the firm, but it also has to convince them to join the firm in the first
place.
Observe that the problem (1) has a recursive structure: m and w can be
determined first without reference to L by minimizing the cost of a worker
w + 5771 subject to (2) and (3); then, once this cost is determined, the profit
maximizing level of employment can be found.10 Each subproblem is strictly
convex, so the solution is uniquely determined, and all firms will make the
same choices: rrii = m, Wi = w and Li = L. In other words, the equilibrium
will be symmetric.
Another useful observation is:
10The recursiveness of this problem is similar to that in Calvo and Wellisz (1979).
Lemma 1 In equilibrium, the incentive compatibility constraint, (2), always
binds.
To see why this is true, note that if it were not, the firm could lower g, and
increase profits without affecting anything else. This differs from the sim-
plest moral hazard problem with fixed q in which the incentive compatibility
constraint (2) could be slack.
By contrast, the participation constraint (3) may or may not bind. The
comparative statics of the solution have a very different character depending
on whether it does. The two situations are sketched in Figures 2 and 3.
When (3) does not bind, the solution is characterized by the tangency of the
(2) with the per-worker cost w + sm (Figure 2). Call this solution (w*,m*),
where:
w = q(m*)'
In this case, because the participation constraint (3) does not bind, w and m
are given by (4) and small changes in u leave these variables unchanged. In
contrast, if (3) binds, w is determined directly from this constraint as equal
to u + e, and an increase in u causes the firm to raise this wage, and since
(2) holds, the firm will also reduce the amount of information gathering, m.
What determines whether (3) binds? Let w and m be the per-worker
cost minimizing wage and monitoring levels (which are not equal to w* and
m* when (3) binds). Then, labor demand of a representative firm solves:
F'(L) =w + srh. (5)
Using labor demand, we can determine n, workers' ex ante reservation utility
from market equilibrium. It depends on how many jobs there are. If aggre-
gate demand L is less than N, then a worker who turns down a job is not
sure to get another; in this case, u = ^{w — e) + (1 — jj)z, where z is an
unemployment benefit that a worker who cannot find a job receives.11 The
11






Figure 2: Participation Constraint is Slack.
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Figure 4: Participation Constraint is Slack.
unemployment benefit z will be useful for some of our comparative statics
below, and we always assume that z is not large enough to shut down the
economy.
When L = N, there are always firms who want to hire an unemployed
worker at the beginning of the period, and thus u — w — e. If there is excess
supply of workers, i.e. L < N, then firms can set the wage as low as they
want, and so they will choose the profit maximizing wage level w* as given
by (4). In contrast, with full employment, firms have to pay a wage equal
to u -f e which will generically exceed the (unconstrained) profit maximizing
wage rate w*. Therefore, we can think of labor demand as a function of
u, the reservation utility of workers: firms are "utility-takers" rather than
price-takers. Figures 4 and 5 show the two cases; the outcome depends on
the state of labor demand. More importantly, the comparative statics of
organization are very different in the two cases.
An equilibrium in this economy is then a vector (u:w,m,L) such that
(i) given u, (w,m,L) are chosen to maximize (1) subject to (2) and (3); (ii)
L < N; and (iii) u = z+min j 1, -^  1 {w—e—z). Note that workers' reservation
utility level, u, plays the role of a price in equilibrating the market.













Figure 5: Participation Constraint is Binding.
1. Full Employment Equilibrium (FEE) in which (3) holds as an equality,
thus u = w — e.
2. Unemployment Equilibrium (UE) in which (3) is slack and thus u <
w — e and w — w* and rh = m* as given by (4).
The proof of this result is straightforward and is omitted; inspection of
Figures 4 and 5 should suffice to make it plausible. In FEE, the participation
constraint (3) binds, w > w* and rh < m*. In this case, in order to attract
workers, the market forces firms to pay wages higher than their imconstrained
optimum w*; as a consequence, they engage in less than their privately op-
timal level of monitoring m*. By contrast, in UE when (3) is slack, there
is an "excess supply" of workers, and firms choose (w*,m*). Cutting wages
below w* would still attract workers, but would be unprofitable for firms




Now, we will carry out three comparative static exercises. First, we will look
at the impact of changing A (or increasing N) which shifts labor demand.12
Second, we will analyze the impact of imposing a wage floor w. Finally, we
will analyze the implications of a change in unemployment benefits, z. In all
three cases, it will matter whether or not the participation constraint, (3),
binds.
First, consider a small increase A and suppose that (3) is slack. The tan-
gency between (2) and the per worker cost, shown in Figure 2, is unaffected.
Therefore, neither w nor m change. Instead, the demand for labor in Figure
4 shifts to the right and firms hire more workers. As long as (3) is slack
(that is as long as the vertical portion of labor demand remains to the left
of N in Figure 4), firms will continue to choose their (market) unconstrained
optimum, (w*,m*), which is independent of the marginal product of labor:
as a result, changes in labor demand do not affect the organizational form of
the firm.
If instead (3) holds as an equality, comparative static results will be dif-
ferent. In this case, (2), (5), and L = N jointly determine q andw. An
increase in A induces firms to demand more labor, increasing w. Since (2)
holds, this reduces q as can be seen by shifting the PC curve up in Figure 5.
Therefore, when (3) holds, an improvement in the state of labor demand re-
duces monitoring. The intuition is closely related to the fact that workers are
subject to limited liability. When workers cannot be paid negative amounts,
the level of their wages is directly related to the power of the incentives. The
higher are their wages, the more they have to lose by being fired and thus
the less willing they are to shirk.
There is another channel which also links the state of the economy to or-
ganizational form. Suppose that when more workers are hired, total resources
spent on monitoring increase13; the cost of monitoring s may increase. This
would induce firms to make less use of monitoring. In fact, the same result
12More generally, all our results would hold with a production of the form F(K, L) with
constant returns to scale. Here, increasing the supply of workers, N, should be thought
as reducing the capital-labor ratio in this economy. If capital could adjust immediately in
response to a change in N so that capital labor ratio was unchanged, then there would be
no impact on the equilibrium.
13Recall that total resources spent on monitoring are mL, so this is possible even if
average resources m are decreasing.
14
would obtain whenever monitoring uses any factor which has a price covary-
ing with the state of labor demand. These issues will be discussed in more
detail in the next section when we endogenize s.
Next, suppose that government introduces a wage floor w above the equi-
librium wage (or alternatively, unions demand a higher wage than would have
prevailed in the non-unionized economy). It is straightforward to see that
Lemma 1 still holds so that the incentive compatibility constraint (2) will
never be slack. Therefore, a higher wage will simply move firms along the IC
curve in Figure 3 and reduce m. However, this will also increase total cost
of hiring a worker, reducing employment.
Finally, suppose that z changes and that u > z. Then it is easy once again
to verify that if (3) is slack, a small change in z affects neither m nor w. On
the other hand, when u = z, a rise in z increases w and reduces m. Also it
is important to note that both high z and high w make an unemployment
equilibrium more likely than a full employment equilibrium, whereas a high
level of labor productivity A makes a full employment equilibrium more likely.
These comparative static results suggest a way of thinking about the cor-
porate structure in the U.S. and Europe. First, European economies, char-
acterized by high minimum wages and unemployment benefits,14 are more
likely to be in unemployment equilibrium, and thus our model suggests that
they should have less monitoring, lower ra, and thus a lower ratio of man-
agerial to production workers. This is the pattern that emerges from the
ILO data reported in Figure 1. The comparative statics with respect to A
suggest that a change in the demand for production workers (say due to
technical change or international trade) should have a very different impact
in an economy in full employment equilibrium as compared to an economy
in unemployment equilibrium. Once again, if the U.S. is thought to be in
the full employment regime and the more regulated European economies in
the unemployment regime, our simple model predicts that in response to a
falling demand for unskilled and semi-skilled workers, wages should fall in
the U.S. and the degree monitoring should increase. In contrast, in Europe,
14Another labor market regulation that is common in Europe is severance pay (firing
costs). These are not as straightforward to incorporate into our model. At one level, they
would act similar to an increase to z, but they would also make firing less desirable for
firms and perhaps make the threat of firing less credible. This will tend to weaken worker
incentives, which will tend to raise monitoring levels and be detrimental to aggregate
performance.
15
only unemployment rates should increase. Therefore, even though many im-
portant effects are left out by these simple comparative statics, the overall
effects resemble the actual trends.
2.3 Welfare
Consider the aggregate surplus Y generated by the economy:
Y = AF(L) - smL - eL, (6)
where AF(L) is total output, and eL and smL are the (social) input costs.
In this economy, the equilibrium is constrained Pareto efficient: subject to
the informational constraints, a social planner could not increase the utility
of workers without hurting the owners. But total surplus Y will never be
maximized in laissez-faire equilibrium:
Proposition 2 The decentralized equilibrium never maximizes Y. Subsidiz-
ing w and taxing profits would increase Y.
This result follows from noting that if we can reduce q without changing
L, then Y increases. A tax on profits used to subsidize w relaxes the incentive
constraint (2) and allows a reduction in monitoring.15 Indeed, the second-
best allocation which maximizes Y subject to (2) would set wages as high
as possible subject to zero profits for firms. Suppose that the second-best
optimal level of employment is L, then we have:16
._,
AF(L)
In this allocation, all firms would be making zero-profits; since in the de-
centralized allocation, due to decreasing returns, they are always making
positive profits, the two will never coincide.
15However, recall that w is the wage that workers receive only when they are not caught
shirking. Subsidizing wages irrespective of whether workers are caught shirking or not
would not affect the incentive compatibility constraint and would not have this beneficial
effect.
16Since the social cost of a worker is e + sm, as long as m and s cannot be made equal
to zero, the optimal level of employment will be lower than it would be under the full-
information first-best. However, since the planner is minimizing this social cost, he will
always want to employ at least as many workers as the decentralized equilibrium would.
16
A different intuition for why the decentralized equilibrium fails to maxi-
mize net output is as follows: part of the expenditure on monitoring, sraL,
can be interpreted as "rent-seeking" by firms. That is, firms are expending
resources to reduce wages — they are trying to minimize the private cost of
a worker w + sm — which is to a first-order approximation, a pure transfer
from workers to firms. A social planner who cares only about the size of the
national product wants to minimize e + sm, and therefore would spend less
on monitoring, increasing net output.
Figure 6 draws the equilibrium, first-best and second-best surpluses as
a function of the supply of labor N for a parametric case. Over the range
of N depicted, the first-best, which prevails when moral hazard is absent, is
simply given by F(N) — Ne. The second-best adopts the wage rule (7) and
also chooses full employment in this range. Finally, the equilibrium is the
outcome characterized in Proposition 1. Observe that the equilibrium surplus
is decreasing in N. This is because high levels of N reduce wages through
the usual supply effect and thus induce firms to increase m in order to ensure
incentive compatibility. This suggests that over a certain range labor market
policies which increase wages and reduce employment will actually increase
surplus, or at least have only a small effect on aggregate welfare.17
This discussion has implications for the contrast of the performance of
European and American labor markets. Our earlier interpretation of Eu- .
rope as in an unemployment equilibrium and the U.S. in full employment is
not imcommon (though as noted above, we are not aware of any other work
deriving implications for organizational form from this contrast). However,
the conventional wisdom is that the labor market regulations, unions and
17In fact, we can show that the equilibrium surplus must be declining in a neighborhood
of NFE, which is the maximum labor force size compatible with full employment equilib-
rium. To see this, observe that at NFE, the equilibrium wage is w* and monitoring level
is m*. Now suppose that the labor force is reduced a bit. This results in an increase in
the equilibrium wage, and an associated decrease in the level of montitoring. But by the
envelope theorem, at their unconstrained optimum, firms suffer no increase in the cost of
a worker, since they were at the otpimium w*. So they will not decrease their demand for
workers, and gross aggregate output is unaffected. But since the level of monitoring falls,
net output increases, as we claimed. Indeed, a straightforward calculation shows that along
the equilibrium surplus curve, %=w-e- sN^fi for JV < NFE; with $fi = -^-r > 0







Figure 6: Plot of the total surplus in first-best, second-best and equilibrium.
minimum wages in European labor markets are purely distortionary and re-
duce output (and net national product). They certainly appear to have led
to much lower employment in Europe, but there is no evidence that out-
put growth or labor productivity have suffered in Europe as compared to
the U.S. Our model suggests that Europe may be at a different point of the
trade-off between wages and monitoring than the U.S. In other words, it is
possible that the U.S. has chosen to increase employment, which in the logic
of our model implies a high level of m. In contrast, Europe may have chosen
relatively low employment, high wages and low m. The rough numbers re-
ported in Figure 1 suggest that this is not totally implausible. And Figure 6
suggests that welfare (total surplus) may be higher in a high m or low m en-
vironment. Thus it is perfectly possible for aggregate performance (in terms
of output and/or growth) in an economy with high wages and unemployment
to equal or even exceed that of a full employment economy. According to
this interpretation, the U.S. and Europe may have chosen allocations that
differ radically in terms of the (functional) distribution of income, but not
much in terms of total output or efficiency.
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3 A Dynamic Model
We now analyze a dynamic model which will generalize the main results of
the previous section and also incorporate some of the effects discussed in
the Introduction which were missing from the static model. This will en-
able us to show that most of the results of the static case generalize to this
dynamic environment, and additionally, even in the equivalent of "unemploy-
ment regime", an increase in the productivity of production workers will lead
to higher wages and less monitoring, thus to a different corporate structure.
3.1 The Environment
As before, there is a measure N of workers and a unit measure of firms.
Time is continuous. All agents are risk-neutral, infinitely-lived, and discount
the future at the rate r. Workers can be employed either to produce output
or to supervise other workers. If a supervisor (manager) is monitoring 1/ra
workers, then a shirking worker is detected with probability q(m). As before,
workers are never mistakenly detected shirking. The cost of effort both to
production workers and managers is equal to e, and this cost is not incurred
if they shirk. Owners undertake the monitoring of managers. If an owner
employing L production workers and mL managers exerts effort amL, then
each manager is caught shirking with probability p(a). We assume that q(m)
and p(a) are smooth, increasing, and concave, with #(0) = p(0) = 0 and q(.),
p(.) < 1. We denote per period wages of production workers by w and the
salaries of managers by s. Observe that to focus on our main interest, we are
making the extreme assumption that managers are not directly productive:
their only role is to gather information and monitor production workers.
This model is closely related to the one studied by Shapiro and Stiglitz
(1984). The main differences from their analysis are that (i) q is endogenous;
(ii) some workers are employed as supervisors; (iii) there is greater scope for
of contracting. On this last point recall that Shapiro and Stiglitz assume that
if a worker is caught shirking, he suffers no monetary penalty but instead is
just fired. In contrast, in our previous analysis, we assumed a worker only
gets his wage if he is not caught shirking. Reality presumably lies somewhere
in between. It is difficult to retain wages for work already performed, but
workers lose their bonuses, their chances of promotion and their pensions
when they are fired. We shall model this in a simple reduced form way by
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supposing that a worker (or manager) is caught shirking can be made to
suffer a financial loss of aw (or as), where a > 0.
3.2 Characterization of Equilibrium
Since there are no adjustment costs, every period firm i maximizes:
Hi = AF(Li) — WiLi — SiTUiLi — aiTriiLi
by choosing Li,Si,Wi,mi, and a; subject to a participation constraints and
incentive compatibility constraints for each occupation.
To write the incentive compatibility constraints, we need to work with
Bellman equations. Let us define Vu, V£, V^1, Vf, Vg* respectively as the
expected present discounted values of unemployment; employment as a pro-
duction worker and exerting effort; employment as a supervisor and exerting
effort; employment as a production worker and shirking; and employment
as a supervisor and shirking. We will use i as an additional argument to
indicate when these values are in principle different across firms. Following
Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), we will concentrate on steady states and thus
impose that the time derivatives for all these value functions are equal to
zero.
Using standard arguments, we can write:
- Vu] (8)
where z is utility when unemployed, x is the probability (flow rate) of get-
ting a job and /i is the fraction of jobs that are managerial. Intuitively, an
unemployed worker gets a job with probability x; with probability /z, this
is a management job, and with probability 1 — fi, he becomes a production
worker. In both cases he gains the expected present value of the relevant job
and loses the present value of unemployment.
All firms take the value of unemployment Vu as given by the market, but
through their choice of wages and corporate structure affect all other values,
hence they are indexed by i. For firm z, we have:
rVp(i) = Wi - e + b [Vv - Vp(i)] (9)
rV?(t) = Si-e +
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where Wi is the worker's wage and S{ the manager's salary in firm z, and b
is the exogenous flow rate at which jobs dissolve. In equilibrium since all
workers exert effort there are no firings for shirking. However, the value of
shirking will be important in determining the incentive compatibility condi-
tions. These are written as:
rVp{i) =
 Wi-qiaWi + (b + qd\yu-Vp(i)] (10)
rVsM(i) = si-Piasl + (b + pi
The main difference between (9) and (10) is that in (10), there is no cost
of effort e, but the relation comes to an end faster as shirking employees
are caught (at the rates q and p). When they are caught, they also lose a
proportion a of their wages.
The two incentive compatibility constraints are:
V£(i) > Kf(i) (11)
v£*(i) > vsM(i)
Simple algebra enables us to write (11) as:
* ~ (r + b)a + 1
(r + b)a + 1
As in the previous section, both incentive compatibility constraints will bind
(otherwise m or a could be reduced).




Although it is somewhat obscured by the notation and restriction to steady-
state analysis, it is important to note that. Vu, the value of unemployment,
is playing a dual role here. First, it is very similar to u in Section 2, the ex
ante reservation utility. But here Vu also enters into the ex post reservation
utility: a worker who is caught shirking receives not 0 as he did in Section 2,
but (1 — a)w + Vu- In fact, in steady state with Vu = 0, if a = 0, these two
concepts will coincide at all points.
Now, the problem of firm i can be written as:
max AF(Li) — WiL — mi(si + ai)Li (14)
Li,rrii,ai,Wi,Si
subject to (12) and (13). This problem is more complicated than (1) in
Section 2, but it is still straightforward to establish that it consists of a
recursive set of strictly convex optimization problems and therefore that the
solution is unique. Thus, we will have wi — w, s^ = s, rrii = m, a^  = a and
Li = L for all i. In particular, we can first determine s and a, then w and q
and then finally, L, which will once more simplify the analysis.
A steady state equilibrium is then a vector fd, s,m, w,L, Vu) in which
(i) the sub-vector (d, s, m, w), L) maximizes (14) subject to (12) and (13)
given V£,;(ii) L(l + m) <N; and (iii) % solves (8) with x = ^ ^ ) L and
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 Intuitively, an equilibrium requires that given the reservation
utility of workers, firms choose the optimal wage, salary and organizational
forms and then the reservation utility of workers be determined consistently
in general equilibrium.
We first have:
Proposition 3 A steady state equilibrium la,s,m,w,L,Vu) always exists.
The proof employs standard arguments which are sketched in the appen-
dix. In contrast to Proposition 1 uniqueness is no longer guaranteed because
of the general equilibrium interactions determining the value of unemploy-
ment, Vu.
It is straightforward to see that the equilibrium takes one of three forms,
depending on which of the two participation constraints bind:
18Provided that L(l + m) <N; if L(l + m) = N, (8) becomes Vu = yVjf + (1 - fj)V£.
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1. Full Employment Equilibrium (FEE) where both participation
constraints in (13) hold as equality. In this equilibrium s = w =
Vu + e, L = N and rh and s solve given(12).
2. Unemployment Equilibrium (UE) where both participation con-
straints in (13) are slack and L < TV. In this regime fa, 5, m, w, LA
maximizes (14) subject to (12) only.
3. Semi-Constrained Equilibrium (SCE) where one of the participa-
tion constraints in (13) hold and the other is slack.
The Semi-Constrained Equilibrium can have either the participation con-
straint of workers or managers bind, but we think of the case where that of
the managers hold, so that s > w, as more relevant. The recursive structure
of the problem once again helps a lot in the analysis. In the full employ-
ment equilibrium, the market dictates what wages must be paid, and thus
w = s = Vy + e. Once the wages are determined, then the firm minimizes its
costs by minimizing monitoring which entails setting rh and s to solve (12).
This has an obvious similarity to the full-employment regime of the static
model. In contrast, in the Unemployment Equilibrium, both participation
constraints are slack, thus the firm is unconstrained by the market and can
choose the wage and monitoring levels that maximize profits19: w = w*,
s = s*, rh = m* and a = a*. In other words, as in section 2, when the ex
ante reservation utility, Vu: is sufficiently low that the firm does not have
to compete with other firms to obtain workers, it can attain its "market-
unconstrained" optimum. In contrast, in the FEE, Vu was sufficiently high
that the firm was forced to pay s > s* and w > w* and choose q < q* and
a < a*.
An important point to note is that when a = 0, there is no possibility to
contract on the wage of the worker when he is caught shirking, so that he
receives exactly the same payment as when he is not caught shirking. In this
case, a Full Employment Equilibrium is not possible. To see this, note that
if the participation constraint binds, then w = rVu + e. Substituting this
into (12) and setting a = 0 gives a contradiction. This is the case consid-
ered by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984), albeit without endogenous monitoring,
and in fact, in their model, equilibrium always entails some positive level of
unemployment. In contrast, the same exercise shows that when a > 0, there
19That is the firm is maximizing (14) subject to (12) alone.
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will exist a sufficiently high level of Vu such that (12) can be satisfied with
w = rVu + e, thus giving a FEE.
3.3 Comparative Statics
Let us start the comparative statics with the Full Employment Equilibrium
(which, recall, is only possible when a > 0). The following proposition is
proved in the appendix:
Proposition 4 In the FEE, ff < 0, ^  > 0, ^  > 0, | f < 0.
The intuition is exactly the same as in the static model. In the FEE,
an improvement in A increases wages (and salaries) and thus makes workers
incentives more powerful. This moves firms along both the incentive com-
patibility constraints of workers and managers, and both types of employees
are monitored less.
Next, let us turn to the Unemployment Equilibrium. Here, in contrast to
the Full Employment Equilibrium, multiple equilibria are possible, and we
have to make sure that we are doing comparative statics on the right equi-
libria. As is well-known in models of multiple equilibria, it is most sensible
to look at the extremal equilibria, here defined as those with the highest or
lowest value of unemployment, Vu. Then we can state (proof in the appen-
dix):
Proposition 5 Consider extremal UE. Then ff < 0, ff > 0, jj > 0 and
da. — n
dA ~ U'
The intuitive reason for this result is that when A goes up, there is more
demand for labor and therefore, wages, and together with wages, salaries
increase. One may conjecture that as in the static model, q would remain
unchanged because the participation constraints are not binding. However,
this conjecture is incorrect due to the cost-of-monitoring effect: the salaries
paid to managers are part of the cost of monitoring, and the cost of monitor-
ing is higher due to the higher managerial salaries dictated by the market.
When monitoring is more costly, firms will want to use less of it, and once
again, a more buoyant labor market leads to less monitoring and more dis-
cretion for production workers. Similar arguments can also be developed for
the case of the Semi-Constrained Equilibrium, and we omit this case. It
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can be noted at this point that if we were to endogenize monitoring in the
exact equivalent of Shapiro and Stiglitz's (1984) set-up with a = 0 and no
cost-of-monitoring effect, then we would have ^ = j% = 0, that is corporate
structure would not respond to changes in the state of labor demand.
Next, it is also straightforward to see that, in this dynamic economy, a
binding wage floor due labor market regulations or wage setting by unions
will work exactly as before. It will push up wages, and therefore induce
firms to reduce monitoring. Therefore, the dynamic model also predicts that
European economies characterized with more wage push should have less
monitoring. We state this as a result and omit the proof:
Proposition 6 Suppose that w is a wage floor imposed by the government.
dm
dwThen, in any steady state equilibrium, ^ < 0.
3.4 Welfare
Once again, net surplus (or net output) is:
Y = AF{L) - (1 + m)Le - mLa
where total production is given by the number of production workers, and
total effort number of workers in employment is (1 + m)L and they incur the
effort cost e and finally, owners incur the monitoring cost a for each monitor,
thus a total of mLa.
Proposition 7 The decentralized equilibrium never maximizes net surplus.
This proposition again follows by noting that the planner would increase
wages and salaries in order to reduce monitoring until there are zero-profits,
but in the decentralized equilibrium firms are making positive profits. Taxing
profits and subsidizing s and w increases total production as more workers
can become producers rather than supervisors.20
20Note that in this case, there are additional issues because the lower of unemployment
induces workers to shirk more, thus creating a negative externality on firms. However, as
in the original Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984) model, this effect is always dominated.
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4 Discussion and Extensions
This paper has developed an approach to the macroeconomics of organiza-
tion. In our model, organizational forms are designed to provide incentives to
workers. When workers cannot be contractually punished arbitrarily severely,
low wages naturally imply weak incentives, and firms are induced to choose
organizational structures that increase monitoring. Wages may be high either
because of labor demand variations or because of labor market regulations.
In particular, when labor demand increases, firms reduce monitoring for two
reasons: (i) workers are paid higher wages and have better incentives; (ii)
monitor's salaries also increase and thus monitoring becomes more expensive.
Counteracting these two forces, when labor demand is higher, unemployment
is low and does not act as an effective discipline device, but we show that
this effect is always dominated by (i) and (ii). We argue that these effects
help to explain why organizations differ across countries and over time. The
model also shows that the organizational differences can have significant im-
plications for macroeconomic performance.
We now consider some further implications and extensions of our frame-
work.
4.1 Income Distribution
The distribution of income is tied to corporate structure because corporate
structure determines both the earnings of production workers, those of man-
agers, and also what fraction of workers become managers.. Also, given that
cross-country differences in corporate structure appear to be correlated with
wage inequality patterns (i.e. the U.S., the U.K. and Canada have experi-
enced sharper increases in wage inequality than other countries in our sample,
e.g. Katz, et al., 1995), it is important to investigate the links between the
evolution of corporate structure and income distribution. To address this
question, we consider a variant of the model in which there are two types of
workers.
4.1.1 The Environment
The two types of workers are capable of doing different kinds of jobs. N
"unskilled" workers can only work in production. H "skilled" workers can
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either work as managers and monitor workers or they can work as engineers.
Total output from production workers is equal to F(L) as before; the mea-
sure of firms is still 1. Engineering output is given by $(E), where E is the
total number of engineers; we assume that there are no incentive problems
for workers in the engineering sector. As before, monitors are not directly
productive. We make the standard assumptions on both production func-
tions: F and $ are increasing and strictly concave and they satisfy Inada
type conditions. We assume that entry into the engineering sector is free
and each engineer is paid his marginal product. Also, college graduates do
not increase their probability of getting into managerial jobs by being un-
employed: they can equally well work as engineers and still receive offers of
management jobs.21
As in the previous section, the flow rate of detecting a worker who shirks
is q(m) where 1/m is the number of workers monitor by one manager and the
flow rate of detecting a shirking manager is p(a); p and q are both increasing
and strictly concave. As before, all agents are risk-neutral, infinitely lived
and discoimt the future at the rate r.
4.1.2 Characterization of Steady State Equilibrium
Firm i once more maximizes:
WiLi — SiUiiLi — aiVfiihi (15)
where S* is salary for the monitors and wi is the wage rate of the workers.
Let us define, V£, V^f, V£, Vg4 as the value functions of working and shirk-
ing managers and workers. Also differently from the previous section, we
need two reservation utilities: Vy, the value of unemployment for unskilled
workers, and VQ value of working in the engineering sector for college grad-
uates, which will act as the ex ante and ex post reservation utility for college
graduates since they can always choose this option.
Now we have the equations (9) and (10) determining the value functions
as before with the only change that for production workers, the reservation
utility is Vu and for managers it is Vc- Combining these two equations, we
can write the incentive compatibility constraints in this case as:
21Thus, there will be no "unemployment" of college graduates; instead there may be
equilibria in which engineers would strictly prefer to be managers.
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+ b) + z + e + bViu
(r + b)a
> jfc)(r + b) + z
Si
 ~ (r + b)a + 1
And the two participation constraints are:
V£(i) > Vv (17)
Once more, the maximization problem of firm i (15) subject to (16)
and (17) is strictly concave, thus has a unique solution. Therefore, we have
Wi = w, Si = 5, nii = m, ai = a and Li = L.
Now, the Bellman equation that determines the reservation utility of un-
skilled workers is:
xp [v£-Vu] (18)
where zp is the unemployment benefit for production workers, and xp is
their job-finding rate, which in steady state is equal to xp = j^zz-
The reservation utility of college graduates can be written as follows:
rVc = &(E) + xm [V^1 - Vc] (19)
where <&'(E) is the wage they receive in the engineering sector and xm = ^r
is the rate at which engineers get managerial job offers, and market clearing
for college graduates implies: E — H — mL.
Then, an equilibrium is a vector (d, 5, m, w), L, Vu, Vc) such that (&, s, m, w, L)
maximizes (15) subject to (16) and (17), and Vu and Vc are given by (18)
and (19) with x*> = ^L-, xm = ^ and E = H - ml.
This model is quite similar to the one-type dynamic model. The next
result establishes the existence of a steady state equilibrium.
Proposition 8 A steady state equilibrium exists and takes one of the fol-
lowing forms:
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1. Full Employment Equilibrium (FEE) where L — N, w = rVu + e,
J = $'(H — rhL) + e and rh and a are given by (16).
2. Unemployment Equilibrium with Managerial Constraint (UEMC) where
L<N,w> rVv -f e, s = &(H - ml)
3. Unemployment Equilibrium (UE) where L < N, w > rVu + e, s >
$'{H — rhL) and (a, s,m,w,L) maximize (15) subject to (16) only.
4- Managerial Constraint Equilibrium (MCE) where L = N, w = rVu + e,
and s > ^'(H — rhL).
The proof of this result is similar to that of Proposition 3 and is omitted.
4.1.3 Comparative Statics
The comparative static results are very similar to those in section 3. In
particular in the FEE, an increase in A (labor demand) leads to higher wages
and to lower m(?;), that is to less monitoring. What is different, however,
is that this increase in A will increase E, the number of college graduates
who go into engineering, and thus reduce >^', and therefore reduce s. Hence,
the prediction of the two-type model is that starting from a full employment
equilibrium, a reduction in the productivity of production workers will reduce
their wages, increase the extent of monitoring but also increase the salaries of
managers. Therefore, in the context of our model, some of the trends of the
U.S. economy over the past twenty years can be explained quite simply by
a reduced demand for production workers. In particular, our model predicts
that in response to changes in the demand for production workers, we should
observe increasing management ratios and relative managerial salaries, which
otherwise have to explained by increasing productivity of managers relative
to production workers.
Next consider UEMC. Again as in section 3, focusing on extremal equilib-
ria, an increase in A increases labor demand at given m(V), and this leads to
a larger number of skilled workers employed as managers (i.e. mL increases).
As a result E falls, this increases s. When 5 increases, as in section 3, the
privately optimal amount of monitoring, m, falls (immediately from the first-
order condition of the firm with respect to m). Therefore, in UEMC, higher
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productivity of workers leads to higher wages both for managers and workers
and to less monitoring.
The contrast between this regime and FEE is interesting. In particular,
it implies that a reduction in labor demand will reduce wages of all types
of labor in the unemployment equilibrium whereas in the full employment
equilibrium, it will reduce production workers' wages but increase managerial
wages and thus inequality. Once again, this stylized result gives a different
way of interpreting the differential trends in the labor markets of Europe and
the U.S.
A testable implication is that a binding minimum wage in the FEE not
only increases wages, but it also reduces monitoring and the wages of man-
agers. This is because as monitoring decreases, there is less demand for
college graduates from managerial jobs, and more of them become engineers,
and the marginal product of engineers and managerial salaries decline.
4.2 Information Technology
Many of the changes in workplace organization and the structure of wages
have been attributed to the changes in information technology. Computers
presumably increase the productivity of workers in many tasks, but surely
information technology is also very helpful for information gathering and
monitoring. Our framework suggests that part of the increased use of com-
puters may be endogenous to changes in labor market conditions, but it also
allows for analysis of the effects of exogenous improvements in computers on
the labor market.
To incorporate computers into our setup most simply, let us make the
extreme assumption that information gathering is the only place in which
computers are useful. Consider the static model of Section 2 and assume
that q = q(m,c), where c is the computer input per worker into the moni-
toring process, and q is smooth, supermodular, strictly concave and strictly
increasing. Let the cost of computers be 7. Then the maximization problem
of firms can be written as:
max AF(L) — wL — smL — ^cL
L,m,c,w




q = q(m,c) (22)
Once again, this problem has a recursive structure: the firm wants to min-
imize the per-worker cost subject to the three constraints. This it will do
by ensuring that (20) binds. Then whatever the optimal wage w, the firm
will minimize sm + 7c subject to q(m,c) = e/w. The last is a well-behaved
convex problem leading to solutions c(w) and m(w) which are increasing in
w. The solution to the problem min w + ^yc(w) + sm(w) s.t. w — e > u must
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be nondecreasiong in u (increasing when (21) binds), so that c and m are
nondecreasing as well.
If there is a reduction in labor demand under full employment, say due to
a fall in A, there will be an increase not only in m but also in c. Therefore,
when firms want to increase monitoring, they will make more use of comput-
ers. If the increased demand for monitoring also leads to a higher salaries for
managers, as in Sections 3 and 4, then this version of the model predicts an
increase in the relative wages of employees working with computers (moni-
tors), which is observed in the data (e.g. Krueger, 1993). It would be naive
to try to explain changes in the wage structure solely by this mechanism, but
it is important to note from this discussion that an increase in the wages of
workers using computers does not necessarily mean that these workers have
become more productive.
In contrast to this endogenous change in the use of information technol-
ogy, exogenous changes in the efficiency of information technology can be
captured by a reduction in 7. This would increase the desired monitoring
level of firms, and in the unemployment equilibrium, would tend to reduce
wages of production workers. In contrast, in the full employment case, firms
would not increase monitoring because they cannot reduce wages, and in-
stead would tend to reduce the their demand for managers. This has some
affinity to the recent developments in the American workplace where some
functions of middle managers are being replaced by computers.
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4.3 Long-Term Contracts
Another dimension of corporate structure is the form of the contract between
the firm and the employees. For example, Japanese firms are often argued to
have much longer-term relations with their employees than U.S. firms (e.g.
Hashimoto, 1994). It has long been recognized that long-term contracts
(LTCs) and similar institutions such as rising tenure-earnings profiles, pro-
motions, and pensions may be powerful incentive devices (see Lazear, 1995).
Intuitively, because compensation is deferred, workers have more to lose un-
der the LTC than under a short-term contract (STC) if they shirk. What
is perhaps less recognized is that the value of long term contracts depends
on the cost of information gathering: LTCs are useful because they enable a
firm to save on monitoring.
In this subsection, we analyze a two-period version of the model of Section
2 which allows for long-term contracts. We make the same assumptions as
we made there except that now everyone lives for two periods and there is
no discounting.
First consider the case of the spot market transactions where the firm
hires labor with a STC in each period. The optimal one period contract is
identical to the one we characterized in Section 2, which implies that the
firm has to satisfy (2). Denote the level of information gathering activity
that satisfies (2) by q{ms) = ~ where w is the equilibrium one-period wage
rate. To simplify the exposition, we will suppose throughout that we are in
a regime where the participation constraint (3) binds, so the firm effectively
takes w as given. Over the two periods, the short term contract will cost the
firm 2sms + 2w per worker.
The alternative organizational form that the firm could adopt is to hire
the worker for two periods using a LTC. In this case, the firm can defer
some or all of the payment of the worker to the end of the second period.
For simplicity consider the most extreme form of this whereby the worker
receives zero in the first period and 2w at the end of the second period if he
is not caught shirking in either period; if he is caught in either period, he
gets zero in both periods.
Start with the incentive compatibility constraint in the second period:
2w - e > (1 - q(m2))2w, (23)
where 7712 is the period-2 monitoring level; if the worker is caught shirking
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then, he loses 2w. Given that he is incentive compatible in the second period,
the worker obtains 2w — e in the first period if he shirks and is not caught;
if he works in the first period he gets 2w — 2e. Therefore, the incentive
compatibility constraint for period 1 of the LTC is:
2w - 2e > (1 - q(m1))(2w - e) (24)
By the same reasoning as before, these constraints will bind, thus:
Monitoring and wage costs associated with this contract are then
srri2 + 2w. Since w > e, both q{mi) and q(m2) are less than q{ms)', thus
there are fewer resources devoted to monitoring under the LTC than under
the STC. The benefit of the LTC is therefore always positive and is equal to
s[2ms - (mi + ra2)]. (25)
One result is immediate: if the cost s of monitoring declines, the benefit of
the LTC falls and, presuming that the cost of using the LTC (in terms of es-
tablishing reputation or loss of flexibility to market shocks) to be unchanged,
we should expect to see fewer of them.
Secondly, the benefit of the LTC also depends on the level of wages,
though here the relationship is more ambiguous. First, all else equal, for
very high wages the benefit is negligible, because the level of monitoring is
small even for the STC.22 For wages close to e, the benefit will tend to be
high. However, it is possible to show that the maximal benefit is attained at
some wage greater than e; a precise characterization depends on the form of
q(-). Thus, it is possible that as wages become more dispersed, as they have
in the U.S. over the last twenty years, there would be an overall decline in
the use of LTCs. The more general point is that as wages and monitoring
costs change with labor market conditions, firms will alter their use of LTCs
just as they alter other aspects of their organizational form.
22However, this point does not imply that in practice, high wage jobs should not have
long-term contracts, because high wage jobs (e.g. airline pilot, manager, physician) are
also very costly to monitor, so they may tend to be governed by LTCs.
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5 Appendix: Proofs of Proposition 3, 4, 5
Here we sketch the proofs of the three propositions in section 3. The re-
maining results in the text have very similar proofs which are not repeated
here.
Proof of Proposition 3: The maximization problem of each firm (14)
subject to (12) and (13) for given Vv = V defines: a(V),s(V),m(V),w(V)
and L(V). As established in the text, these are all functions; by the maximum
theorem, they are continuous in V. It is straightforward to establish that
(1 + m(V))L(V) is a decreasing function of V, and therefore, the equation
(1 + m(V))L(V) = N has a unique solution, which we denote by V. It also
follows immediately from the same monotonicity that (1 + m(V))L{V) < N
if and only if V > V.
Substituting the two value functions in (9) into the right-hand side of (8)
we define, for V > V:
1 (r + b)z + x(V) [ - W H - W _ el
Gl{V)
 = r (r + b)+x(V)
where
 X{V) = *$$$$>. As V | V, Gl{V) -+
G2(V). Therefore an equilibrium, by construction, corresponds to a fixed
point V of
v>v
{ G2(V),V<V ' (27)
provided L(V) < N. We will now prove that (27) has a fixed-point that
satisfies this property.
First observe that G(V) is continuous. Next, we show that G(V) is
bounded by showing that both of its components are. To start with, since
C?2 is continuous on the compact domain [0, V], it is bounded above. Next,
write G\ as
!
 (r + b)z{N - (i + m(V))L(V)) + b(l + m(V))L(V) [^Sy?00 ~ e]
r (r + b)(N - (1 + m(V))L(V)) + 6(1 + m(V))L(V)
Because A^  > (1 + m(V))L(V) > 0 on V G (V, oo) , the denominator is
bounded by bNr and (r + b) Nr; the numerator is bounded below by 0. Also
because
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} L(V)[m(V)s{V)+w{V)\ < AF{L(V))
AF(N) (the second inequality because maximized profit is always nonnega-
tive), the numerator is bounded above by (r + b)zN + bAF(N). Thus G\ is
bounded above and below, proving that G(V) is a bounded function.
Now consider the continuous, bounded function
H(V) = G(V) + max {min {l, (1+m<y)Wv) - l} , o} . Since H continuously
maps a compact domain onto itself, it has a fixed point V. We claim that
this is an equilibrium.
If (1 + m(V))L(V) < TV, V is also a fixed point of G and is an equi-
librium by construction. To complete the proof we need to show that (1 +
m{V))L(V) < N. Suppose (1 + m(V))L(V) > N : then V < V and so
V = H(V) > G2{V) = \ f f f l t ^ j y ^ - el . But adding the two partici-
pation constraints (13) together gives V < \ I^I^H?)^ ~ e] ' w h i c h i s a
d Th b l h h lcontra iction. is esta lis es t e claim.
Proof of Proposition 4: Let rVu + e = v. For full employment we have
that:
AF
' ( l + m(t.)) = " + m ( " ) ( " + a{v)) ( 2 8 )
where a(v) and m(v) solve (12). N/(l + m(?;)) is the number of production
workers that need to be employed when the monitoring level is given by m(v)
in order to ensure full-employment. It is straightforward to see that, since p
and q are concave, a(v) and m(v) are decreasing functions of v.
Next note that the firm is actually choosing s and a subject to the con-
straint that s > v, thus s — v if and only if 9U^V^ < 0. Thus, we have
1 + a'(v) > 0. By the same argument regarding the choice of w and m, we
have l + m'(v)(v + a) > 0. Therefore, the right-hand side of (28) is increasing
in v. In contrast, the left-hand side is decreasing in v, since m'(y) < 0 and
F" < 0. Therefore, a full employment equilibrium, when it exists, is uniquely
defined. Now an increase in A raises the left-hand side, thus requires an in-
crease in the right-hand side, hence an increase ini>. ^ > 0, ^ | >0>§[ < 0
and | | immediately follow from | j > 0. •
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Proof of Proposition 5: UE is characterized by:
AF'{L*)-w* -m*(s* + a*) = 0 (29)
(r + b) e rti-^ .
(r + b)a + 1 Q(m*)2
(r + 6) e
~(r + 6)o;+lP(a*): -P'(a*) + 1 = 0
and also (12) and (8). It is then straightforward to see that a* is fixed, but
all other variables vary with Vu = V, thus we have s*(V), m*(V) and w*{V)
with 5* and w* as increasing functions of V and m* as a decreasing function
of V. Then substituting into (8), we obtain:
(r + b)z + z(V0 \m'iVl?ZlZr{V) - el
- ^ J±=^p J- (30)
(r + 6)r + 6x(F) v '
where rc(V) = ^ t ^ ( ^ L % - S i n c e t h e riSht-hand side of (30), G(V),
is a non-linear function, we cannot establish uniqueness of Unemployment
Equilibrium. But it is clear that (7(0) > 0 and also limy—<x> G(V) < oo.
Thus, the extremal equilibria always have G(V) cutting the 45° line from
above. Next, note that an increase in A for given Vonly affects L*, thus
x. In particular, x increases when A goes up. Hence, a higher A shifts
G{V) up,therefore, at extremal equilibria: ^r > 0. This immediately implies
that at extremal equilibria, jj^, — > 0 and ~ < 0, but a remains at a*. •
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